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Book Review: Is Science Self-Corrective 
ames R. Wible’s T he Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology 
as if Economics Really Mattered, originally published in 1998, has been 
reprinted in paperback by Routledge in 2014. This essential work has been the 
most significant work focusing the attention of the philosophers of science on the 
economic character of scientific research. 
Wible’s works on Milton Friedman, John Dewey, Charles Sander Peirce, and 
Nicholas Rescher (1982, 1984, 2008, 1994) have long been well-known. His The 
Economics of Science, a seminal piece of scholarship in the field of economics of 
scientific knowledge, has also been well-known and reviewed a number of times 
by prominent economic philosophers (Sent 2000, Hands 2000, Diamond 2006). I 
would like to use this opportunity to inform the readers of this journal about the 
reprint of Wible’s The Economics of Science and re-assess his work from the 
viewpoint of the theory of intellectual path dependency in economics (Yalcıntas, 
2016, Forthcoming). My intention here is to pick up one of the issues in the 
philosophy of science, namely, self-correction in sciences and humanities, and 
argue, somewhat contrary to what Wible claimed in his The Economics of Science, 
that science does not always correct itself.  
Self-correction in science means that errors, mistakes, and misinterpretations 
are automatically cleared off if and when scientists have the opportunity to 
exchange ideas freely. As Wible remarks, “[f]rom an economic point of view, 
science seems to move forward most rapidly when structured as small-numbers 
pluralism. Progress in science, to the extent that it occurs, is a consequence of 
focusing scarce scientific resources and the best scientific minds on the very best 
theories and their next best alternatives” (Wible 1998: 2). Although I think that 
scientists vigorously debate viewpoints of other scientists, I argue that sciences and 
humanities are not always self-corrective, neither in the short nor the long runs. 
Under the conditions of intellectual path dependence, where the standard 
procedures of scientific reasoning such as critical rationalism (Popper) and 
dialectics (Hegel) do not clear the market of ideas from the consequences of 
enduring errors and mistakes, errors remain uncorrected. The invisible hand in 
science, so to speak, does not properly work. Let me elaborate. 
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James R. Wible, interim department chair and professor of economics at Peter 
T. Paul College of Business and Economics of the University of New Hampshire, 
isan eminent scholar working on the economics of science, scientific misconduct, 
and research ethics in economics. The readers of this journal may find it interesting 
to know that Wible was one of the two keynote speakers at the first-ever workshop 
on scientific misconduct in economics, held in Izmir on 21 and 22 August 2014. 
The title of the workshop was “International Workshop on Scientific Misconduct 
and Research Ethics in Economics.” (For more information, see website of the 
Research Association for Knowledge Integrity in Economics, a scholarly network 
set up by a group of economists who are concerned about the unresponsiveness of 
the professionals in economics to the significance of the problem of research 
misconduct, at http://rakie.org/.) In The Economics of Science, Wible argues that 
the economics of science has begun with the general problem of misconduct in 
science, which he thinks is the main source for market failure in academic 
economics. In economics, market failure is characterized by a tendency towards 
moving away or inability to reach to a Pareto optimum state of equilibrium. 
According to Wible, failure in the market of ideas occurs because there is a cost for 
using market mechanisms in scholarly life. In other words, scholarly life is a 
positive transaction costs world in the sense that universities and research institutes 
produce ideas for science in which high transaction costs of pursuing science 
require institutional scientific arrangements (such as awareness against fraud and 
plagiarism, definite codes of behavior, etc.) to cure the negative externalities that 
may come about as a result of scientific effort. Universities and research institutes 
minimize the costs that emerge from risk aversion in scientific markets. The reason 
why scientific institutions exist is that the sciences have an economic dimension. 
This dimension is about the efficiency problem of scholarly activity. 
Science is a “resource-using endeavor” (Wible 1998: 170) and resources in the 
scientific market are scarce. As a result, the opportunity cost of (not) using a 
specific resource in the market is often high. Wible argues that, under such 
circumstances, researchers are like entrepreneurs making a multi-period calculation 
of the value of each research program in each time period. This calculation 
involves items such as initial costs of putting the project in place and revenues to 
be gained from implementing the project. Researchers get involved in a research 
program if the net present value of the project is greater than all other projects. 




3. Replication failure. 
“Fraud” and “plagiarism,” in the sense Wible uses the terms, involve deliberate 
violation of scientific principles whereas replication failure is a dynamic 
mechanism in science in which intentions of individuals are not necessarily a 
constituent of the working of academic scholarship. Replication failure is the 
inability or unwillingness of researchers to test the result of previously published 
scholarly work. It is through replication that theories and research programs are 
checked in terms of their defensibility, consistency, and coherency. Although 
replication should be an essential component of scholarly work, it is not frequently 
handled by researchers because “an economist might allocate a larger proportion of 
time to producing new publishable results devoting relatively less time and effort to 
the tasks required for replication” (Wible 1998: 25). Replication of results is time 
consuming and there is no reward for scholars to repeat another’s work. No 
significant research devotes time and effort to replicating the findings of earlier 
theories and research programs without compensating their economic loss. Instead, 
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researchers rely on the results of papers published in academic journals and they 
simply “reproduce” their findings without examining its significance and validity 
(Mirowski & Sklivas 1991, 154). 
Wible reports that the reason why replication rarely takes place in scholarly life 
is, for instance, that processes of inference and judgement are not totally individual 
but rather a social phenomenon. It is difficult to replicate certain experiments 
without the specialized knowledge of earlier researchers. Sometimes, derived 
results of earlier works could be unreplicable: data may be lost, technical 
possibilities may not allow researchers to set up identical experimental 
environments, there may be informational asymmetries, and so forth and so on. 
Moreover, attempts by rival scientists and graduate students to criticize and publish 
new findings on older data as part of their routine scientific doings are construed as 
hostile acts. 
In other words, subsequent research depends on previous studies. Findings of 
prior studies are used as input for upcoming research. When researchers embark on 
a new research project, they allocate time between replicable and unreplicable 
research. Authors, referees, and editors of journals often assume earlier findings are 
valid without retesting them in significant ways because replication takes time and 
this imposes significant costs on researchers. Bypassing replication generates the 
probability of genetic (i.e. reproductive) errors that had occurred in an earlier study 
but not noticed in time. In scholarly life, it is expected that such errors will be 
corrected as scientists do further research on the subject matter. But because of the 
costs of running such tests, some errors may pass unnoticed and be left 
uncorrected. This is a source of intellectual path dependence in which scientific 
markets operate in the absence of an invisible hand that could have prevented 
errors from happening or corrected them in the long run. Seeds of intellectual lock-
in are stored in the scholarly market within the epistemic costs (Yalcintas 





The Figure demonstrates a typical path formation in scholarly life. In this 
scenario, first generation models include influential articles whose findings, by 
virtue of innovative research programs, are (re-)formulated in original ways. After 
the first generation models, findings are popularized and spread in the market. 
Second generation models often take the form of textbooks and secondary or 
follow-up research, the findings of which are primarily borrowed from first 
generation models. Second generation models are so influential that they frequently 
cite first generation models as well as each other and, as a result, their citation 
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figures increase logarithmically. Their results are thus established in the market. 
The findings of the first generation models are not often replicated because of high 
opportunity costs of allowing time for re-testing the findings of others. Reputation 
and power also affect the selection process of researchers where scholars utilize the 
works of reputable authors to legitimize their own findings (Sterman & Wittenberg 
1999). For instance, research conducted by Nobel laureates and powerful 
institutions with which Nobel laureates are affiliated (such as Rand Corporation, 
see Mirowski, 2002, 153-231) are highly credited and further research is often 
directed by the outcomes of such authors’ work. During all of this, access to 
financial resources and possibilities of finding research partners play prominent 
roles. This intermediary phase is thus (i)economically constructed so that the 
growing popularity of the first and second generation models operates under 
increasing returns, (ii) the search for research funds is highly influential on the way 
further research (and its methodology) is conducted, and (iii) epistemic costs 
determine whether to replicate the findings of the original research program. 
Now, my point is that during the process of path formation, there is no 
guarantee that errors, no matter how small or how big, are corrected. Who can ever 
know that findings and methodology of a particular piece of scholarly publication, 
if and when the findings and methodologies are not tested for validity, do not 
contain any mistakes? And who can ever assure that mistakes in the finding and 
methodologies, if and when they are not tested for validity, will eventually be 
corrected? As Wible remarks, too, “[t]he economizing of resources thus exposes 
science to mistakes,” (1998: 31). However, he does not show how the market of 
ideas would be cleared off from these mistakes. Wible only claims that “[a]t some 
point, these mistakes will be discovered and they will have to be corrected. From 
an economic point of view, there needs to be a balance between resources devoted 
to replication in its simpler forms and innovation. Attitudes and reward structures 
which are skewed toward innovation may set science up for replication failures of 
many types. But mistakes need to be corrected or they will impede scientific 
progress and innovation at some point” (Wible 1998: 31). 
Wible original work has been one of the best pieces of scholarship in which it is 
argued that economics can be used to account for the ways in which academic 
economists work. I fully agree with Wible that science is economically 
constructed. I, however, would also like to claim that the assumption that science is 
self-corrective is unrealistic because there are plenty of cases in the history of 
economics where economists are not able to correct the errors involved in models 
published in the past. The “Coase Theorem” is just an example where economists 
have used the “theorem” to mean zero transaction costs although many scholars, 
including Ronald Coase himself, noted that this is the opposite of what he meant 
(Medema 2011b, a, McCloskey 1998). Also, Steve Ziliak and Deirdre McCloskey 
have shown statistical significance tests are overused and misused in economics 
(Ziliak & McCloskey 2008); statistical significance tests are still in use. (For 
further examples and discussion, see the special issue of the Review of Social 
Economy, forthcoming in 2016, entitled “Scientific Misconduct and Research 
Ethics in Economics.”) I, therefore, contend that self-correction in sciences cannot 
be generalized because we cannot know whether scientists, under the conditions of 
positive epistemic costs, are always able to correct the errors in academic 
scholarship. It seems more realistic to me to assume that scientists are prone to 
errors and errors are embedded in academic scholarship. The question is the 
following: why does the nature of the processes of scientific knowledge production 
at universities not allow us to correct errors fully? Although there is an enduring 
tendency among scholars to criticize each other’s work, there have always been 
cases where it is epistemologically costly to lock out the sciences from erroneous 
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findings and methodologies. This is perhaps a reason why economists keep using 
invalided theories. As philosophers and historians of economics, we should rather 
research into specific cases in which errors are not corrected. Wible’s The 






Diamond, A. M., Jr. (2006). What really matters: Review of James R. Wible's The 
Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as if Economics Really 
Mattered.  Journal of Economic Methodology, 5(2), 304-310. DOI: 
10.1080/13501789800000018 
Hands, W. D. (2000). The economics of science: Methodology and epistemology 
as if economics really mattered by James R. Wible. Review of Social Economy, 
58(3), 404-406 
McCloskey, D. N. (1998). Good old coase theorem and the good old Chicago 
School: A comment on Zerbe and Medema. In Coasean Economics: Law and 
Economics and the New Institutional Economics edited by Steven Medema, 
239-248. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Medema, S. (2011a). A case of mistaken identity: George Stigler, ‘The problem of 
social cost’, and the Coase Theorem.  European Journal of Laws and 
Economics 31(1),11-38. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1650649  
Medema, S. (2011b). The Coase Theorem: Lessons for the study of the history of 
economic thought.  Journal of the History of Economic Thought 33(1), 1-18. 
DOI: 10.1017/S105383721000060X 
Mirowski, P. (2002). Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mirowski, P., & Sklivas, S. (1991). Why econometricians don’t replicate 
(Although they do reproduce).  Review of Political Economy 3(2), 146-163. 
DOI: 10.1080/09538259100000040 
Sent, E.-M. (2000). Wible's the economics of science: Methodology and 
epistemology as if economics really mattered.  Research in the History of 
Economic Thought and Methodology 18(1), 365-368. DOI: 10.1016/S0743-
4154(00)18044-7 
Sterman, J. D., & Wittenberg, J. (1999). " Path dependence, competition, and 
succession in the dynamics of scientific revolutions. Organization Science, 
10(3), 322-341. DOI: 10.1287/orsc.10.3.322. 
Wible, J. R. (1982). Friedman's positive economics and philosophy of science.  
Southern Economic Journal 49(2), 350 60. 
Wible, J. R. (1984). The instrumentalisms of Dewey and Friedman.  Journal of 
Economic Issues 18(4), 1049-1070. 
Wible, J. R. (1994). Charles Sanders Peirce's economy of research. Journal of 
Economic Methodology 1(1), 135-160. DOI: 10.1080/13501789400000009 
Wible, J. R. (2008). How is scientific knowledge economically possible?: Nicholas 
Rescher’s contributions to an economic understanding of science. In Rescher 
Studies: A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher, 
edited by Robert Almeder, 445-476. Frankfurt: Ontos/Verlag. 
Yalcintas, A. (2013). The problem of epistemic cost: Why do economists not 
change their minds (About the 'Coase Theorem')?. American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, 72(5), 1131-1157. DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12037. 
JEPE, 2(S1), A. Yalcintas,p.223--228. 
227 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
Yalcintas, A. (2016). Forthcoming. Intellectual Path Dependence: Why Economists 
Do Not Reject Refuted Theories. London: Routledge. 
Ziliak, S. T., & McCloskey, D. N. (2008). The Cult of Statistical Significance: How 












































Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
JEPE, 2(S1), A. Yalcintas,p.223--228. 
228 
